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Kopp: Kopp: Securities Arbitration Awards of Punitive Damages

Securities Arbitration Awards of
Punitive Damages: Protective or
Expansive Steps for Review?
Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
An award of punitive damages is often the most significant and detrimental
part of an award arising from a judicial or arbitral proceeding. In 1995, the United
States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split upholding an arbitral panel's authority to award punitive damages under a securities arbitration agreement. 2 This
decision was monumental in establishing arbitral power. However, it left several
questions unanswered. For example, which, if any, standards should be applied to
such awards?
This casenote addresses the reviewability of punitive damages awards arising
out of a securities arbitration hearing.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
For seventeen years Stephen B. Sawtelle (Sawtelle) was the registered representative of Waddell & Reed, Inc. (Waddell), a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). 3 Waddell terminated Sawtelle's employment on February 9, 1997, citing personal differences and suspicions about
his security practices. 4 Sawtelle claimed his termination was in retaliation for his
testimony against a fellow Waddell broker, David Stevenson, before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). 5
In July 1997, Sawtelle filed a statement of claim with the NASD against
Waddell and certain officers and representatives, alleging tortious interference
with business expectancy and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act (CUTPA).6 On November 14, 1999, Waddell countered by filing a statement
of claim against Hackett Associates, Inc. (Hackett), Waddell's competitor and
Sawtelle's new employer as of February7 10, 1997. The claim was based on Sawtelle's actions following his termination.

1. 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
2. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). See Carroll E. Neesemann
& Maren E. Nelson, Securities ArbitrationDamages, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1999, at 683, 70715 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B0-0092, 1999) [hereinafter Neesemann
& Nelson, SecuritiesArbitration Damages].
3. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
4. Id.
5. Id. The SEC subsequently convicted Stevenson for embezzling millions of dollars from his
clients. Id.
6. Id. at 268; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-11 Oa, et seq. (1995).
7. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 267-68.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2004, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 17
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. I

The day after Sawtelle's termination, Waddell sent letters to all 2,800 customers previously represented by Sawtelle informing them that Sawtelle was no
longer employed by the company and explaining potential tax liabilities and other
fees which they would incur if their investments were transferred from Waddell to
Hackett. 8 On February 26, 1997, Sawtelle mailed letters to the same customers
9
As a
informing them of his transfer to Hackett, and soliciting their
0 business.
customers.'
prior
result, Sawtelle retained a large portion of his
Throughout the subsequent months, Sawtelle's customers who attempted to
contact him at his old employment were informed by Waddell that Sawtelle's
whereabouts were unknown and suggested that Sawtelle may have engaged in
mail
past criminal conduct similar to David Stevenson." Waddell also re-routed
2
and phone calls from Sawtelle's Connecticut office to Waddell's office.'
Following NASD rules, Waddell prepared a Form U-5, Uniform Notice of
Termination, citing "personality differences" as their reason behind Sawtelle's
discharge from the firm. 13 Waddell checked "yes" to questions fourteen and fifteen on the form, stating Sawtelle was under investigation by a governmental
body or self-regulatory organization, and he was under internal review for fraud or
wrongful taking of property. 14 The Form U-5 filed by Waddell also cited a customer complaint about the inadequacy of Sawtelle's services. A subsequent in15
vestigation led the NASD to issue a "no action" letter in regard to this complaint.
Waddell later filed amendments to Sawtelle's Form U-5, reporting dozens of new
complaints to Sawtelle's work. The NASD also issued "no action" letters for
these additional customer complaints.16
On September 11, 2000, a three-member arbitration panel consolidated all of
the claims between the parties and granted Hackett's motion to dismiss Waddell's
claims. 17 The panel held fifty days of hearings over the following two and a half
years.' 8 The panel granted an award in favor of Sawtelle for joint and several
liability against all parties for $1,827,499 in compensatory damages and $747,000
in attorneys' fees. 19 The panel further found joint and several liability for punitive
damages against Waddell and its president Robert L. Helchler for their reprehensible conduct in deception of Sawtelle's clients in the amount of $25 million.20
Following the arbitration panel's award, Sawtelle commenced proceedings in
the New York Supreme Court to confirm his award.2' Waddell and its fellow
defendants cross-petitioned the court to vacate or modify the damages award,
claiming that it was erroneous to include attorney's fees within the compensatory
damages, since they were already awarded separately, and claiming the punitive
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 269.
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damage award was irrational and in manifest disregard of the law. 22 Waddell
argued that judicial review of punitive damage awards, even in arbitration awards,
23
is governed by the standards set forth in BMW of North America v. Gore. The
4
the
However,
court declined to modify or vacate the punitive damages award.
to
award
the
reducing
award,
damages
the
compensatory
modify
court did
$1,080,499 because attorney's fees had already been separately awarded.2 5 In its
decision, the court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 26 limits the scope
of review for arbitral awards and stated even if the Gore standard was applied, the
damage award was not illegal, irrational, or in violation of public polpunitive
7
icy.

2

The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the lower
court's modification of compensatory damages, holding that modification of compensatory damages is allowed under the FAA "where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures. 2 8 The court vacated the punitive damage award
and remanded that issue for further consideration, 29 holding that the Gore standards should be applied to determine whether a punitive damage award in arbitration is excessive under the FAA. 30 Applying this standard, the court held the punitive damages award was in manifest disregard of applicable law, and the degree
of reprehensibility did not support a punitive damages award of $25 million. 3'

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that the FAA exemplifies "a
strong 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,' providing only for
extremely limited judicial review of an arbitration award., 32 The limited review
of arbitration awards has been attributed to the need to promote the two basic
"settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and
goals of arbitration, namely,
33
expensive litigation."
In the last two decades it has become increasingly common for parties to request judicial review of arbitration awards. It is well-established that an arbitration award subject to review under the FAA can only be vacated in one of two sets
of circumstances: those set forth in the FAA, or those based on non-statutory

22. Id.
23. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (setting forth three guidelines
for determining when an award is grossly excessive: (1)the degree of reprehensibility of conduct; (2)
the disparity between the award and the harm or potential harm suffered; and (3) the difference between the remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
27. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
28. Id. at 275 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 11(a)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 271.
31. Id. at 271-73.
32. Id.at 269 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))).
33. Porush v. Lemire, 6 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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grounds, such as manifest disregard of the law or evidence, contravention of public policy, or irrationality. 34 Section 10 of the FAA states that a court may:
[M]ake an order vacating [an arbitration award] upon the application of
any party to the arbitration--(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.35
Additionally, a court can vacate an award under the "manifest disregard of the
law" standard only if the law was "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator," and
"the arbitrator knew the existence3 6 of a clear governing principle but decided to
ignore it or pay no attention to it."
The FAA also provides a more limited standard of review to be applied in
modification of an arbitration award.37 A court may modify an arbitration award
only upon a finding of one of the following:
[T]here was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award [or] [wihere the arbitrators have awarded upon a
matter not submitted to them ... [or] [w]here the award 38is imperfect in
matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
If a court makes one of the previous findings then it is authorized to modify and
correct the award as to "promote justice between the parties. 39
A. Manifest Disregardof the Law
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been asked to
4
review arbitration awards for manifest disregard of the law on several occasions. 0
One such case is Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker.4 1 On
March 11, 1985, Bobker informed his broker, Merrill Lynch, that he wished to
34. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 269. See Porush, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 181; McDaniel v. Bear Steams &
Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 343, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations omitted).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
36. Porush, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 182 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,
808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986)).
37. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2000).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id.; see also Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998); DiRussa v. DeanWitter Reyonlds Inc., 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997).
41. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
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short sell 2,000 shares in Phillips Petroleum Company. However, Merrill Lynch
cancelled the transaction before carrying out Bobker's request because it believed
the transaction would violate Section 10(b-4) of the Securities Exchange Act and
SEC regulations.42 Subsequent to the cancellation, Bobker submitted a claim to
the New York Stock Exchange claiming Merrill Lynch's actions prohibited him
from receiving a $23,000 profit upon the exercise of the short sale.
Pursuant to the rules of the New York Stock Exchange an arbitration panel
was appointed and returned a decision granting $12,500 in favor of Bobker. 4
Following this award, Merrill Lynch filed a petition to vacate the award in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming such
award was in manifest disregard of the law.45 The district court agreed with
Merrill Lynch and vacated the award, finding the arbitration panel was aware of
the SEC regulations, and that Bobker's transaction "would have resulted in the
kind of disparate treatment
of tendering shareholders [the SEC regulation] was
6
intended to prevent.A
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision to vacate the arbitration award. 4 7 The appellate court, following the reasoning of the SEC amicus brief, interpreted Section 10(b-4) of the
Securities Exchange Act and the SEC regulation as designed to prevent a "shareholder from double-tendering stock in response to a partial offer and thus increase
the percentage of the violator's stock accepted for purchase and dilute that of
other tendering stockholders. ''4s The appellate court rejected Merrill Lynch's
claim that the transaction would have violated Section 10(b-4) of the Securities
Exchange Act and SEC regulations, because the transactions Bobker had proposed
(withdrawing the tender of 2,000 of the 4,000 shares or covering the short sale
with the purchase of 2,000 additional shares) were legal. 49 The court concluded
the short sale proposed by Bobker was not manipulative or deceptive, and would
not have violated the purpose of the statutes and regulations asserted by Merrill
Lynch.5 ° Therefore, because Bobker's requested transaction met these pre42. Id. at 931-32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b-4) (1984). This section was
adopted by the SEC in 1968 with the intent of prohibiting "short tendering," i.e., "tendering more
shares than a person owns in order to avoid or reduce the risk of pro rata acceptance in tender offers
for less than all the outstanding securities of a class or series." Short Tendering Rule, 49 Fed. Reg.
13867 (Apr. 9, 1984) (codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b-4) (1984)). On April 9, 1984, the SEC announced the adoption of amendments to Rule 10(b-4), which did not substantially alter the rule however, included a prohibition of the practice of hedged tendering, i.e., "tendering and then selling a
portion of the tendered shares in the market." Id. Additionally, Rule 10(b-4) was again amended by
the SEC in order to further prohibit hedged tendering through the use of call options. Short Tendering,
50 Fed. Reg. 8100 (Feb. 28, 1985) (codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b-4) (1985)). In 1990, the SEC redesignated Rule 10(b-4) as Rule 14(e-4), which still prohibited both short tendering and hedged tendering however eliminated the "prohibition of multiple tendering to competing partial offers." Prohibited
Transactions in Connection with Partial Tender Offers, 55 Fed. Reg. 50316 (Dec. 6, 1990) (codified in
17 C.F.R. § 240.014(e-4)).
43. Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 931.
44. Id. at 932-33.
45. Id. at 933.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 937.
48. Id. at 935.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 936.
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requisites, the arbitration panel's decision was not in manifest disregard of the
law. 5
More recently, in the case Halligan v. PiperJaffray, Inc., the Second Circuit
was again asked to review an arbitration award under the "manifest disregard of
the law" standard.52 In Halligan,an equity investments salesperson claimed that
he had been terminated in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).53 The claim was heard before a panel of NASD arbitrators, but before
54
the conclusion of the hearing, the plaintiff, Theodore Halligan, passed away.
His widow, Mrs. Irene Halligan, took up the claim and continued the arbitration.55
Both sides produced testimony as to whether Halligan was terminated because of
his age.56 In March 1996, the arbitrators denied relief to Halligan in a written
opinion.57
Mrs. Halligan petitioned the court to vacate the arbitrator's decision. 58 She
claimed that "given the very strong evidence of discrimination and the clear description of the applicable law presented to the arbitrators, the award reflected
manifest disregard of the law." 59 In response to Mrs. Halligan's petition, the defendant agreed that the governing law was not disputed by the parties but argued
that it was not the court's place to review the merits of the decision since it was
supported by ample evidence. 60 The court declined to grant Mrs. Halligan's petition stating, "Crediting one witness over another does not constitute manifest disregard of the law [and] this court's role is not to second-guess the fact-finding
done by the panel.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the order,
stating Halligan had presented overwhelming evidence to the arbitration panel that
he had been terminated and the termination was motivated by age discrimination.62 The court further stated the record indicated agreement on the legal standards for burden of proof and an adequate understanding of the law by the arbitrators. 63 The court concluded that given the strong evidence that Halligan was terminated because of his age as well as the panel's apparent knowledge of the applicable standards, the court was inclined to hold that the panel ignored the law or
evidence or both. 64

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 198. See 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (2000).
Halligan, 148 F.3d at 198.
Id.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204.
Id.
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The United States Supreme Court set forth the standards for determining
whether a punitive damages award in a civil case is "grossly excessive" and
thereby in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Ira Gore, Jr. 65 BMW sold Gore a new sports
66
sedan but failed to disclose that it had been repainted after pre-delivery damage.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Gore in the amount of $4,000 for compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages, finding the "non-disclosure
67
policy constituted 'gross, oppressive or malicious' fraud" under Alabama law.
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered remittitur with instructions that
68
constitutionally reasonable punitive damages would be $2 million in this case.
On further appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision found
the Alabama Supreme Court's remittitur order "grossly excessive" and inconsistent with BMW's right to due process because BMW did not receive notice of the
large sanction the state might impose on such conduct. 6 9 The Court established
three factors in determining whether a punitive damage award violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the degree of reprehensibility
of the party's conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages to the actual harm inpenalties that could be imposed for
flicted on a party; and (3)
70 the civil or criminal
comparable misconduct.
The Court reversed the award of $2 million in punitive damages because it
7
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' Applying the
three-factor analysis, the Court found the harm BMW inflicted was purely ecoaward. 72
nomic, and not one that would give rise to a $2 million punitive damages
The Court went on to state the punitive damage award granted by the Alabama
Supreme Court amounted to 500 times the amount of actual harm inflicted, well
73
The
over the four-to-one ratio generally held as constitutional in past cases.
civil
maximum
"the
Court further stated the award was "grossly excessive" in that
penalty authorized by the Alabama Legislature for violation of its Deceptive
Trade Practices Act is $2,000," and other state statutes authorized penalties only
7
up to $10,000. 4

65. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).

66. Id. at 563-64.
67. Id. at 565 (citing ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20, 6-11-21 (1993)).
68. Id. at 567.

69. Id. at 574-75.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 576, 580.
Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 584.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Three-PartGore Test
In the instant case, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held
that despite the strong federal policy limiting arbitration award review, punitive
damage awards in securities arbitrations under the FAA are subject to the limitations set forth by the United States Supreme Court in BMW ofNorth America, Inc.
v. IRA Gore, Jr.7 The court noted that Gore "established the constitutional limits
on the imposition of punitive damages," and that it applies to situations in which
plaintiffs sole challenge is that the damage award is "grossly excessive," without
asserting a due process claim. 76 The court further stated the Gore test is "not only
applicable to due process analysis of a punitive damage award but also provides a
guide for determining whether such an award is irrational.""
The court ruled the $25 million punitive damages award excessive and running afoul of the Gore three-part test.7 8 First, the court ruled that the third step of
Gore-the degree of reprehensibility of a party's misconduct-was the most important for determining the irrationality of a punitive damages award. 79 Because
Waddell's actions were a one-time occurrence and had little or no impact on Sawtelle's earnings, the court held that this was not a case that would support such a
large damage award.8 ° Second, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages was approximately twenty-three-to-one, well above the common four-toone ratio mentioned in Gore.8' In fact, the court noted that punitive damages
awarded under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) have typi82
cally followed the standard laid out in Bailey Employment System v. Hahn,
merely "doubling the amount of actual or compensatory damages.' 83 Third, the
award was "vastly out of proportion to the civil or criminal penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct." 84 Most CUTPA awards have ranged from
$250 to $450,000, and no CUTPA case heard in federal court has ever exceeded
$1 million.85 The court distinguished the two largest
86 CUTPA awards from the
instant decision on the grounds of severe misconduct.

75. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
76. Id. at 270.
77. Id. at 271.
78. Id. at 271-73.
79. Id. at 271.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 272.
82. 545 F. Supp. 62, 73 (D. Conn. 1982), aft'd,723 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1983).
83. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
84. Id.
85. Id. at272-73.
86. Id. at 273 (describing one of the cases as involving hundreds of millions of dollars in a "bait and
switch" scheme, and the other involving a decade-long nationwide plot intentionally stalling the processing of large insurance claims).
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The court also found a second ground for reversal in that the arbitrators completely ignored applicable law.87 During the arbitration, Sawtelle's counsel informed the arbitrators that "'proportionality' of punitive damages was 'a very big
constitutional issue,"' and courts have typically granted punitive damages under
CUTPA at a two-to-one ratio.88 Sawtelle's counsel also specifically informed the
arbitration panel that neither CUTPA nor Connecticut case law would support a
treble damage award. 89 The court recognized that "both parties generally agreed
on the applicable law ... and explained it to the arbitrators," but the arbitrators
failed to adhere to it. 9° The court concluded that since both sides agreed on the
well-established proportionality rule and the panel was specifically informed of
damages award.., was made in manifest disthe rule, the "$25
91 million punitive
regard of law."
C. PublicPolicy
The court rejected Waddell's argument that the arbitration award violated a
"well accepted and deep rooted public policy. '92 Waddell argued that the award
violated public policy because it punished the company for following the NASD
rules requiring the reporting of all customer complaints, which would result in
sanctions if not followed. 93 The court acknowledged Waddell's claim, but emphasized that "not a single complaint resulted in any action by the NASD," and the
arbitration panel did not refer to the amended Form U-5 by Waddell in the imposition of the punitive damages award.94 In light of these facts, the
95 court refused to
find the punitive damages award violated a strong public policy.
D. Award Modification
The court ruled the modification of the compensatory damages award by the
lower court did not violate the FAA.96 The court interpreted the provision under
the FAA providing for modification of an award "where there was an evident
material miscalculation of figures ... ,9 as authorizing a modification "when an
arbitration award orders a party to pay damages that have already been paid or
which are included elsewhere in the award. 98 Sawtelle claimed the lower court
erred in reducing the compensatory damages because the amount reduced was
meant to be compensation for emotional distress and/or general damages associ87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 273-74.
Id. at 274.
Id. (quoting Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 274-75 (citations omitted).
id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 276; see 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2000).
Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1 (a)).
Id.
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ated with a negative effect on his reputation.99 The court, however, found no evidence in the record to support any such claim and thus concluded it was not a
"legitimate
basis for disputing [the] allegation of double recovery" for attorney's
00
fees.'

IV. COMMENT
Resolving disputes through arbitration is beneficial for individuals who want
to settle their disputes more efficiently and inexpensively than through litigation.' 0 ' Central to accomplishing these goals is the generally established principle
that an arbitrator's decision isfinal or extremely limited on review. 1 2 This concept of finality
arises from the strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration
03

awards.

A. Should ArbitrationBe Subject To Due Process Challenges?
In line with this presumption of finality, several courts have ruled that arbitral
punitive damage awards are not subject to due process challenges because they do
not arise from a state action.104 This rationale stems from the well established
principle that constitutional due process protections "do not extend to 'private
conduct abridging individual rights,"' but only to state action. 05 Thus, several
courts have ruled that arbitration hearings, invoked by voluntary private action,
lack the state action element of a due process claim, and therefore punitive damages awarded by arbitrators do not warrant the scrutiny of the Due Process
Clause. 10 6 This holding seems to further the underlying goals of arbitration in that
it follows the FAA's goal of enforcing arbitrator's awards by severely limiting the
means by which an arbitral award may be challenged. However, this prohibition
may also create disincentives to engaging in arbitration by preventing review of
large punitive damages awards, and in turn, 0undermine
the vital role of arbitration
7
as a means of alternative dispute resolution.1
99. Id. at 276.
100. Id.
101. Porush v. Lemire, 6 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); see Carroll E. Neesemann & Maren
E. Nelson, The Law of Securities Arbitration, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2000, at 829, 898 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. BO-OOKP, 2000) [hereinafter Neesemann &
Nelson, The Law of Securities Arbitration].
102. Porush, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 181; Neesemann & Nelson, The Law of Securities Arbitration, supra
note 101, at 898.
103. Porush, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 181. See Wall Street Assocs., L.P. v. Becker Paribas Inc., 27 F.3d 845,
849 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983)).
104. Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 138 (6th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Prudential
Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (1 th Cir. 1995); Austem v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. 716 F.
Supp 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that CBOE arbitration is not state action), aff'd on other
grounds, 898 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990).
105. Davis, 59 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191
(1998) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961))).
106. Id. at 1191-95. See Glennon, 83 F.3d at 138.
107. See Edward Wood Dunham, Are There Due Process Limits on Arbitral Punitive Damage
Awards?, 23 FRANCHISE L.J. 3 (Summer 2003).
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Despite the strong presumption to enforce arbitration awards, the Sawtelle
court seems determined to undermine the underlying principles of arbitration by
expanding the reviewability of arbitration awards through judicially-created
grounds-allowing a court to overturn an arbitration award of punitive damages
because it is "grossly excessive."'10 8 The Sawtelle court sidestepped the established position that private arbitration agreements are not subject to due process
scrutiny by characterizing the Supreme Court's Gore standard as based not only
on due process grounds, but on the concept of irrationality as well.10 9 The Sawtelle court fails to provide any substantial rationale as to how it arrived at this
conclusion; it merely cites a few cases where the Second Circuit applied the Gore
test. 10The court adopted the Mathie v. Fries ruling, which stated that "[t]he Supreme Court's guideposts in Gore, though marking outer constitutional limits,
counsel restraint with respect to the size of punitive awards even as to the nonconstitutional standard of excessiveness."'' The court also referenced the decision in
Sanders v. Gardner, where the Second Circuit held a $10 million punitive damages award was not a violation of the individual's due process rights and that such
an award was "constitutionally sound and supported by the evidence" under an
independent Gore analysis.' 12 Nevertheless, even if the test can be construed to
provide guidelines in reviewing punitive damage awards, both the Second Circuit
and the Sawtelle court fail to acknowledge any possible ramifications that such
adoption may have in jeopardizing the simplicity and efficiency arbitration was
designed to create.
B. Gore Test v. FAA 's Policy to Enforce ArbitrationAwards
By allowing additional review because an award is "grossly excessive," Sawtelle creates another crack in the strong policy favoring the enforcement of an
arbitrator's award. Sawtelle attempted to justify the inclusion of a "grossly excessive" standard with the FAA's strong pro-arbitration policy by focusing on the
rationale behind the development of the Gore test.' 13 The three-part Gore test was
designed to allow a jury some degree of latitude in protecting and furthering state
legitimate interests by "punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition." 114 However, it was also created to limit damages awards to only those
amounts which are reasonably necessary to vindicate such interests.' 5 In light of
the underlying theory of the Gore test, the Sawtelle court inferred that because the
test incorporates wide latitude to the fact-finders in their determination of the size
of an award, its application to punitive damages awards in an arbitration setting

108. Id. at 5. See also Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d. Cir. 1998) (establishing
the "manifest disregard of law" standard of review for arbitration awards).
109. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
110. Id. See Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1997); Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805,
809-12 (2d Cir. 1996); Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151, 176-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
111. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (quoting Mathie, 121 F.3d at 817).
112. Sanders, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
113. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
114. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
115. Id.
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would not
disrupt the FAA's presumption to enforce the original arbitration
16
award.'
Even if one agrees with this rationale, that the Gore test does not go against
the FAA's policy, there are still several broad reasons for not allowing expansion
of such review. One of the strongest is the importance of arbitration as an efficient alternative to litigation. If a court is allowed to broadly question an arbitrator's final determination, then arbitration could become just another expensive and
time consuming layer within the complex litigation process. 11 7 In the instant
situation, given that no set ratio of compensatory to punitive damages has been
declared per se constitutional, the application of the Gore test could cause courts
to review each situation on a case-by-case basis in order to determine the upper
limit of what is "grossly excessive." This would allow a party to delay, by motions or 8appeals, any proceeding where a large punitive damage award is
granted. 1
A further argument against expanded review arises from the currently accepted practice of creating stricter judicial review of arbitration awards in predispute contracts. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that by
"agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.""' 9
Although not all courts follow this view, the Tenth Circuit refuses to allow contractual expansions on the grounds that such expanded review undermines the
independence of the arbitration process and finality of arbitration awards. 20 The
same argument could be made against a court reviewing an award under the Gore
test, in that both parties voluntarily chose to give up their right to judicial review
by choosing arbitration in favor of an efficient and cost-effective means of dispute
resolution and should therefore be barred from later arguing against an unfavorable ruling.
C. Is the Gore Test Even Necessary?
The Sawtelle court reaches its holding under an expanded notion of the Gore
standard (that the award is irrational), but it later declares under the same rationale
that the award is in manifest disregard of the law.' 2' The court concluded the
arbitrators were explicitly informed on the issue of proportionality of punitive
damages under Connecticut law by agreement of both parties prior to their decision. Thus, "their failure to adhere to the relevant standards constitutes 'manifest
disregard [of the law].""1 22 Given this analysis, the issue turns to whether the
Gore test is even a necessary additional form of review in the dispute resolution
field, when protection from the same error is found in an already well-established
principle of review. The Sawtelle court simply fails to provide any solid justifica116. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
117. See Albert G. Besser, The ArbitratorBlew It! Now What?, VT. B.J. Summer 2003, at 39.
118. See Neesemann & Nelson, SecuritiesArbitration Damages,supra note 2, at 733.
119. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)).
120. Id.
121. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 271, 273.
122. Id. at 274 (quoting Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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tion as to the necessity of such an expansion, which directly contradicts
23 the strong
federal policy of extremely limited judicial review of arbitral awards.1
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court only recently established the power to review punitive damage awards on due process grounds, and many jurisdictions
have simply not faced the issue. However, it may arise quite frequently in the
future. The decision in Sawtelle, adopting a separate ground for review of punitive damages awards, is one that signals a significant change in the field of arbitration. The court's adoption of the Gore test could be interpret as an attempt by
courts to promote dispute resolution through arbitration by protecting a party from
a decision by an incompetent arbitrator, thus eliminating any disincentive to arbitration which may arise from the fear of being held liable for extremely large punitive damage awards. On the other hand, the adoption of the Gore standard indicates a breakdown of the independence associated with arbitration hearings and is
another attempt by courts to expand their power to regulate fields of dispute resolution. The lack of clear policy justification, along with the generalizations made
in arriving at this decision, leaves this case open to interpretation as to which interest is actually being furthered.
At this point it is too soon to determine the lasting effect this decision will
have in the field of dispute resolution. This case may have a negative effect on
the simplicity associated with the arbitral process or it may provide a positive
regulatory effect over abusive actions by arbitrators. For the sake of individuals
desiring a quick and cost-effective means of resolving a dispute, let's hope it is the
latter.
ANDREW KoPP

123. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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